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Conservation of biological diversity is often hampered
by ignorance and short-sightedness. Yet knowledge is not
enough; biology illuminates ecological relationships, but
it alone cannot conserve ecosystems. Therefore, we agree
that there is no higher priority for conservation biolo-
gists than to improve their understanding of economics
(Orr 2004, Law 1). Unfortunately, from many of his com-
ments and the tenor of subsequent responses (Hayes
2004; Vitek 2004; Lovejoy 2004), it is evident that eco-
nomics and, more important, parallels between ecology
and economics are misunderstood, implying the two dis-
ciplines are more different than they are and that knowl-
edge of economics is primarily needed to enhance the ap-
peal of ecological insight. We offer comments intended
to (1) correct misunderstandings about the parallel sci-
ences of ecology and economics; (2) present a broader
perspective on efficiency, selfishness, ecological bubbles,
and conditions for growth; and (3) discuss the appropri-
ate role of science in addressing natural resource prob-
lems. Efforts to maintain ecological integrity will benefit
when we abandon the erroneous assumption that igno-
rance and selfishness per se cause environmental prob-
lems.
Ecology Is Economics
Economics is generically defined as the study of scarce re-
source allocation, yet it is predominantly associated with
human behavior and monetary transfers. Thus, many bi-
ologists consider economic issues peripheral to ecology,
viewing them as human constructs with potentially dis-
astrous consequences for organisms or ecosystems (Law
1). Like ecology, economics is all about who gets what,
when, how, and how much. Economic theory has been
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successfully applied to numerous ecological issues and
businesses must conform to ecological principles to sur-
vive. Nevertheless, few scientists appreciate the vast eco-
nomic landscape within ecosystems or realize that ecolo-
gists, biologists, and economists study the same phenom-
ena, albeit using seemingly proprietary terminology.
Resource scarcity is inherent in both economic and
ecological problems (Law 2). Both disciplines study how
biological organisms, including people, allocate available
resources to their most highly valued uses and assess
which contexts encourage more efficient and effective
behaviors. Ecologists tend to support allowing ecologi-
cal processes to proceed without inordinate intervention
and many economists agree. The free market environ-
ment championed by neoclassical economists is simply a
context-dependent ecological analog of nature. Diversity,
choice, and evolution are important ecosystem character-
istics for all creatures, including humans. Furthermore,
there is nothing about the free market that precludes
the provision of any ecosystem good or service, includ-
ing conservation and environmental protection. Unfortu-
nately, we just cannot afford to have as much of everything
as we might want.
When conservation or environmental protection doesn’t
occur, it means that either there was another, higher
valued use of the resource or there is a distortion that
results in lower valued uses being selected (Law 3). If
the former occurs, it’s not bad, selfish, or immoral, but
simply a reflection of societal or individual preferences.
If the latter is the case, it indicates structural problems
in attributing benefits to those that bear the cost of a
transaction. This problem is a common occurrence in
the natural world even though evolutionary processes
act to minimize the negative impact of these relation-
ships over time. Some conservationists have forgotten
nature’s ability to adapt to an ever-changing environment
and propose inappropriate interventions on behalf of in-
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Efficiency Isn’t Evil
Maximizing efficiency does not create inefficiency in the
way Orr (2004; Law 1, Corollary 2) describes. Efficiency
can be loosely defined as making the best possible use of
scarce resources, in other words, minimizing costs and
reducing waste. Unless the cumulative financial, ecolog-
ical, social, and individual benefits of these activities are
compared against their costs, there is no way to determine
whether or not they are efficient. Efficiency doesn’t imply
fairness and cannot claim the purpose of prosperity, secu-
rity, benevolence, or reputation as argued by Orr (2004).
It is simply a ratio that indicates whether resources are
allocated to their most highly valued use within a given
context. Employed correctly, efficiency would see that
clean water goes to the thirsty before it is used on the
lawn. As markets and the economy as a whole become
more efficient, fewer resources are wasted. We suspect
that Dr. Orr’s unstated comment may have been that what
is efficient for the individual can be inefficient for a greater
society. This is true, tending to occur when resources ex-
hibit public goods characteristics that can lead to “tragedy
of the commons” scenarios in which long-term social
welfare is reduced by individuals seeking to maximize
short-term self-interest. Nonetheless, individuals can be
encouraged to act in society’s interest if the appropriate
contingencies are created.
Selfishness and Self-Interest are Ecological
Synonyms
Self-interest is an evolutionary necessity; survival de-
mands it (Law 1, Corollary 1). Few behaviors do not in-
volve self-interest. Even altruism is a form of cooperative
strategy that is clearly self-interest viewed from one of
two alternative perspectives. People are generally either
internally or externally rewarded for being “selfless.” For
individuals that value the reward, it is a good purchased
with the behavior. When the community is the organism
of focus, cooperative strategies contribute to the survival
of the larger entity, often enhancing the viability of in-
dividuals and making self-interest clearly evident when
individuals identify themselves as constituents of broader
entities. On the other hand, selfishness is a strictly subjec-
tive term commonly interpreted as a disregard for others.
From this perspective, the wolf and its prey are both self-
ish, yet nature encourages enough killing to efficiently
meet needs—not wanton destruction. Therefore, holis-
tically speaking, absolute selfishness absent immediate
self-interest has no ecological or economic precedent.
Self-interested liberals may be trying to figure out how
to limit human appetites (Orr 2004; Law 2), but unless this
“limiting” is seen by the individual as voluntary and is re-
flected as a change in preferences, such efforts will fail. By
definition, involuntary limits infringe on freedom. Appar-
ently some among us are willing to elevate themselves
over the rest of the world’s populace to decide whose
freedom should be limited and how much to limit it. Lest
this responsibility be entrusted to special interests or the
state, we remind everyone that we have tried economic
systems that intensively regulate human behavior—they
are commonly referred to as socialism and communism.
Ecological and Economic Bubbles are Ephemeral
Hayes (2004) states that natural resource consumption
should not end up in the income column because it is
a loss and argues the existence of an ecological bubble
similar to economic bubbles. When a stock resource is
depleted, a cost commensurate with the loss of capital
is incurred, but benefits are also created because there
is a conversion to a higher valued product. Capital may
change form in the process but change is not necessar-
ily entropic to an ecosystem. Waste to one organism is
very often a resource to another. All types of wealth are
subject to re-evaluation and natural capital is no different
from any other currency in this regard. With a few ex-
ceptions, oil was worthless high entropy waste 150 years
ago, and low entropy potential did not exist. Now it is
readily converted to plastics, fuel, and other products.
Three billion years ago oxygen was high entropy waste.
When a resource is more valuable as a currency than as a
stock, it should be used.
Biologists readily recognize that ecological overshoots
are common in the environment, resulting in population
boom and bust cycles, yet it seems this is something
Homo sapiens are obligated to avoid (Hayes 2004). What
is wrong with allowing a human boom and bust cycle? Is
our species to exempt itself from normal ecological pro-
cesses? It is na¨ıve to assume that the human populace is
collectively sleepwalking toward the edge of ecological
tragedy (Orr 2004; Law 3). First, there are significant ques-
tions as to whether this is actually occurring, and second,
even if we are on the brink of disaster, backing away from
the precipice may involve costs we are not willing to pay.
Tradeoffs are inherent in any decision and this may be a
case where the cure is worse than the disease. A prefer-
ence for one pattern should not automatically be seen as
an ecological necessity while an alternative preference is
vilified. If the argument is that one strategy or another will
“damage” the Earth (Lovejoy 2004), then we have two
comments: (1) Are other natural boom and bust cycles
also deleterious? (2) Even if we annihilate all compound
organisms, won’t there still be bacteria—the most dom-
inant form of life on Earth? Ecosystem processes—reset
by our actions or not—will continue.
Conditions can Promote Creativity or Collapse
We acknowledge the existence of many environmental
problems that continue to compromise the health and
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welfare of ecological and human systems. Orr (2004; Law
3) states that in many cases the remedy is available but is
not implemented. Oftentimes proposed remedies focus
more on the symptoms than on the disease. A prepon-
derance of environmental ills can be distilled into prob-
lems with property rights and limited access to capital.
Bernstein (2004) posits that four conditions are neces-
sary for rapid and sustained economic growth: effective
property rights, scientific rationalism, capital markets,
and speedy transportation of goods and communications.
Property rights that are poorly defined, overtaxed, or
under-enforced provide large incentive for overuse and
waste. Further, if capital is not available for enterprises to
develop and see their goods and services through to pro-
duction, very little will happen. A lack of capital results
in short-term decision making that discounts long-term
processes. Without repeated application of the scientific
model, critical system components are overlooked or mis-
understood. Without communication and transportation,
innovation and adaptation are retarded.
If problems that exist at the very heart of environmen-
tal issues are not addressed first, then any other proposed
solution will fail. Contrary to Vitek (2004), conservation
does not suffer from an excess of truth and a paucity of
marketing. One cannot open a magazine, watch the news,
or listen to the radio without being inundated with stories
about environmental ills. There is a six-month waiting list
for the Toyota Prius; people are not unaware. Perhaps we
simply too often offer the wrong kind of truth—seemingly
conflicted details buried in the jargon of academic jour-
nals rather than coherent and consistent insights into im-
portant processes.
Rose-Colored Glasses and the Role of Science
Environmentalism isn’t the safety glasses in the toolbox
(Vitek 2004); it is the tint of the lens. Conservationists and
environmentalists have spent too much time and energy
trying to “tap some deeper motivation than narrow self
interest” (Orr 2004; Law 4). A far easier, less intrusive and
more straightforward tool is available—incentives. Like all
organisms, people respond to incentives. Trying to con-
vince the general populace of the nobility of an action,
the greater good to be gained, or the deep ecology of the
movement is an inefficient use of time and energy. For
most people, environmental self-actualization is just too
far up Maslow’s hierarchy of needs. Day-to-day decisions
at least as basic as whether to eat, fill up the gas tank, or
contribute to an emergency fund regularly trump saving
the Atlantic tuna or an obscure tree frog. Incentives, on
the other hand, affect day-to-day preferences and thus
decisions. If you want people to purchase certified tuna
or timber, make it cheaper than the alternative. If you
want people to recycle newspapers, charge a deposit. Al-
though simpler said than done, this approach conforms
much more consistently to ecological principles than do
dictatorial or centrally planned methods. To be efficient
we should advocate better systems, not just different out-
comes.
Advocacy in a democracy is important, but it is not
the role of science. Scientists should spend less energy
publishing articles that promote activism and more en-
ergy investigating problems and coherently articulating
answers to the questions that matter. Although science
can inform us about what might be done to realize de-
sired outcomes, it cannot tell us what outcomes should
be pursued. Objectives such as limiting human growth or
preserving Brazilian rainforests are not ecological imper-
atives; regardless of their implications, they are simply
preferences. Conserving rainforests may mean less fuel
for firewood and less agricultural land or more local em-
ployment and a preservation of a traditional culture. The
degree of conservation should be based on the tradeoffs
people are willing to make. Explicitly or implicitly forc-
ing values on others by obscuring the distinction between
facts and preferences may appear to be a viable avenue
for achieving desired objectives, but it risks backlash and
loss of credibility. Positive, proactive, and generative ef-
forts offer far more potential for success than does re-
strictive regulatory activity reminiscent of the confined
feeding of zoo animals. That, at the level of the impact, is
the antithesis of ecological principles in action.
Don’t accept ignorance or groupthink (Orr 2004)—use
the tools and knowledge afforded by science to attack
them systematically and aggressively.
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